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The importance of holding corporate leadership responsible for
their actions has, at least for the moment, assumed a place of
prominence in American popular consciousness. However, despite the
swarms of investigators buzzing around many cultural icons and
multinational corporations in search of wrongdoing, an ugly truth
remains: in Minnesota as in many other states, boards of directors are
protected from shareholder litigation by a plethora of substantive and
procedural obstacles. In the face of these barriers, shareholders are
often powerless to rectify the negligent or even intentional wrongdoing of
management. One of the most troublesome of these barriers is the
“special litigation committee,” purportedly objective persons typically
charged by a board of directors to decide whether shareholder
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grievances with the board are valid.
This May, the Minnesota Supreme Court weighed in on the issue of
special litigation committees for the first time in Janssen v. Best &
1
Flanagan. The Janssen decision provides some confusing but tantalizing
hints that the Minnesota courts may be ready to increase their scrutiny of
internal corporate governance. This article describes the history,
substance, and holding of Janssen and explores what it might mean for
the business judgment rule in Minnesota. The article concludes by
arguing that the Minnesota courts should abandon the deferential
approach they have traditionally taken to special litigation committee
decisions and that the Janssen decision empowers the lower courts to
take the lead in doing so.
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically the only method for a shareholder to take action against
a director for wrongs to a corporation was through a shareholder
2
derivative action. While derivative actions should, in theory, promote
director accountability, commentators have questioned whether they
offer any real benefit to shareholders or any real check on the power of
3
directors. In an attempt to address these concerns, Minnesota has, like
most other jurisdictions, imposed several procedural barriers to bringing
a derivative claim. The first such obstacle is rule 23.06 of the Minnesota
Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 23.06”), which requires any shareholder
or member seeking to initiate derivative litigation to first demand that the
4
corporation’s board of directors initiate the litigation. Failure to comply
with this rule prior to filing a derivative claim is grounds for dismissal
5
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Such a demand is excused only if a plaintiff
1. 662 N.W.2d 876, 882 (Minn. 2003).
2. A derivative suit is a procedural mechanism by which a shareholder, in the case
of a business corporation, or a member, in the case of a nonprofit corporation, may
initiate litigation in the name of the corporation in order to enforce the corporation’s
rights. See id. at 881 (citing Brown v. Tenney, 532 N.E.2d 230, 232 (Ill. 1988) (stating
that “[t]he derivative suit is a device to protect shareholders against abuses by the
corporation, its officers and directors, and is a vehicle to ensure corporate
accountability”)).
3. See, e.g., Roslyn Falk, May a Shareholder Who Objects to a Proposed
Settlement of a Derivative Action Appeal an Adverse Decision? A Report on California
Public Employees’ Retirement System v. Felzen, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 235, 240-41 (2000)
(asserting that derivative suits do not substantially deter misconduct and serve only to
generate excessive attorneys’ fees).
4. MINN. R. CIV. P. 23.06.
5. Wessin v. Archives Corp., 592 N.W.2d 460, 464 (Minn. 1999) (holding that
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properly alleges that the board is so biased as to render a demand futile.
The second obstacle is more difficult to overcome. If a board of
directors declines to join in a proposed derivative suit, Minnesota courts
will defer to that decision and dismiss the derivative suit absent evidence
or allegations that the board members acted in bad faith or were
7
incapable of making the decision impartially. This deference is an
8
application of the “business judgment rule,” which generally requires
courts to accept the decisions of corporate management on matters of
9
company business, including whether or not to pursue litigation. Even
10
where a board is alleged to harbor bias with respect to a given decision,
the business judgment rule allows the board to overcome that allegation
11
of bias by delegating that decision to a “special litigation committee.”
Typically such committees consist of directors or other persons who
were not involved in the subject matter of the litigation and have no
12
personal interest in it.
This committee is given full authority by the
board to investigate the claims articulated in the derivative suit and to
decide whether the corporation should step in and assert those claims

compliance with MINN. R. CIV. P. 23.06 is an indispensable prerequisite to bringing a
derivative action).
6. Id.
7. St. James Capital Corp. v. Pallet Recycling Assoc. of N. Am., Inc., 589 N.W. 2d
511, 515 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999). An allegation of bias, which is pled prior to such board
action, is sufficient to bar the board from making such a decision. See, e.g., Black v.
NuAire, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). However, once the board has
considered the action, only actual evidence of bad faith will obviate the deference
accorded under the business judgment rule. St James, 589 N.W.2d at 515.
8. Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 882 (Minn. 2003) (“The business
judgment rule means that as long as the disinterested director(s) made an informed
business decision, in good faith, without an abuse of discretion, he or she will not be
liable for corporate losses resulting from his or her decision.”) (citation omitted).
9. See, e.g., Black, 426 N.W.2d at 210 (explaining that business decisions should
be left to company management, who are presumed to act in the corporation’s best
interests).
10. A typical example of such a situation would be when a board must decide
whether or not to join in proposed derivative litigation against one or more of its own
members. Id.
11. Drilling v. Berman, 589 N.W.2d 503, 506-07 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999); Skoglund
v. Brady, 541 N.W.2d 17, 21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
12. See Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 727 (8th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980) (stating that the board decisions were made in “bad faith,”
particularly where “the directors, themselves, are subject to personal liability” in the
proposed action, which raises the most serious questions about whether the board is
entitled to protection under the business judgment rule and that special litigation
committees can address these potential concerns by appointing “disinterested” persons to
make a decision for the board).
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13

itself.
Minnesota courts have traditionally reviewed the decision of
such committees only to determine whether it was made independent of
14
board influence and in good faith.
The practical effect of the business judgment rule when combined
with the demand requirement of Rule 23.06 is to prohibit shareholders or
members of a corporation from bringing a derivative lawsuit against the
wishes of the board unless: (1) the board is alleged to be incapable of
making an impartial decision, and (2) the board lacks the good sense to
15
appoint an independent committee to make the decision for it. Some
commentators have claimed that the system prevents the derivative suit
16
from functioning effectively. These criticisms appear to be borne out
by empirical studies, which suggest that nearly all committees
17
recommend that the corporation not join in the derivative action.
Additionally, special litigation committees are typically composed of
attorneys and corporate directors, who may be particularly subject to the
13. See Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 888 (stating that it is the task of the special
litigation committee to “dispassionately review the derivative lawsuit” and decide
whether it should be pursued).
14. Id. Courts in other jurisdictions have recognized the potential for abuse that
exists in this system and have allowed for a more extensive review of special litigation
committee decisions. See also Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del.
1981) (holding that a court should defer to committee only if committee is independent
and its decision comports with the court’s own business judgment); Biondi v. Scrushy,
820 A.2d 1148, 1164 n.40 (Del. Ch. 2003) (discussing the problem of structural bias in
the context of special litigation committees); see also Houle v. Low, 556 N.E.2d 51, 59
(Mass. 1990) (holding that a court should decide whether committee is disinterested and
whether it “reached a reasonable and principled decision”); Alford v. Shaw, 358 S.E.2d
323, 327-28 (N.C. 1987) (holding that reviewing court must determine whether action
complained of was just and reasonable to the corporation).
15. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 23.06. See also Winter v. Farmers Educ. & Co-op. Union
of Am., 259 Minn. 257, 267, 107 N.W.2d 226, 233 (Minn. 1961) (stating that a “demand
should be made on the board of directors unless the wrongdoers constitute a majority of
the board” or it is “plain from the circumstances that [a demand] would be futile”).
16. See George W. Dent, The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder
Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 96, 105-09 (1980)
(arguing that the use of special litigation committees may effectively prevent derivative
suits in most cases).
17. James D. Cox, Searching for the Corporation’s Voice in Derivative Suit
Litigation: A Critique of Zapata and the ALI Project, DUKE L.J. 959, 963 (1982)
(observing that nearly all special litigation committees reject proposed shareholder
derivative litigation). Similarly, in all cases where the Minnesota Court of Appeals has
had occasion to review the decision of a special litigation committee, the committee has
found that pursuing the demanded litigation is not in the corporation’s best interests. See
Skoglund v. Brady, 541 N.W.2d 17, 21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Black v. NuAire, Inc.,
426 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); Drilling v. Berman, 589 N.W.2d 503, 50607 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
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influence of the board that appointed them as well as biases originating
in their elite socioeconomic status that could prevent them from being
18
impartial.
Until Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, the Minnesota Supreme Court
had not addressed the use of special litigation committees and the
19
Minnesota Court of Appeals had done so only in three cases. Janssen
extended the rule to Minnesota nonprofit corporations and, most
importantly, defined the role of such committees by balancing corporate
20
autonomy and shareholder rights.
To further that balance, the court
adopted a bright-line rule requiring trial courts to allow derivative actions
to proceed if the decision of the special litigation committee is found
21
wanting.
This “one strike and you’re out” standard undermines the
traditional business judgment rule in Minnesota and the broader concern
of the court by “balancing” corporate self-governance and derivative
22
claims. The rule may set the stage for further limitations on the use of
23
special litigation committees by Minnesota corporations.
This article will first consider the origin and development of the
24
business judgment rule in Minnesota. Next, this article will offer an
analysis of Janssen, discussing the reasoning of the decision and the
25
implications that it has for Minnesota nonprofit corporations. Finally,
this article will describe how Janssen may signal a retrenching of the
traditional deference Minnesota courts have shown to corporate boards
and consider the possible future of the business judgment rule in
26
Minnesota.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS GOVERNING
SPECIAL LITIGATION COMMITTEES IN MINNESOTA
The business judgment rule was applied to corporate decisions
27
regarding whether or not to participate in litigation as early as 1917.
18. See Strougo v. Bassini, 112 F.Supp.2d 355, 362-63 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing
biases inherent in special litigation committee system).
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Part III.C.
22. See infra Part IV.
23. See id.
24. See infra Part II.
25. See infra Parts III&IV.
26. See infra Part IV.
27. United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-64
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However, the use of special litigation committees as a tool to mute
28
allegations of board bias first became common in the 1970s. Special
litigation committees did not make an appearance in Minnesota
jurisprudence until Minnesota Statutes section 302A.243 was enacted in
29
1981.
At the time, there was substantial debate among both
commentators and courts about whether such committees should be
permitted and, if so, what level of deference their decisions should be
30
accorded.
For example, many courts have questioned the allegedly
(1917).
28. Richard C. Brown, Shareholder Derivative Litigation and the Special Litigation
Committee, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 601, 616 (1982).
29. The statute provided:
Unless prohibited by the articles or bylaws, the board may establish a
committee composed of two or more disinterested directors or other
disinterested persons to determine whether it is in the best interests of the
corporation to pursue a particular legal right or remedy of the corporation
and whether to cause the dismissal or discontinuance of a particular
proceeding that seeks to assert a right or remedy on behalf of the corporation.
For purposes of this section, a director or other person is “disinterested” if
the director or other person is not the owner of more than one percent of the
outstanding shares of, or a present or former officer, employee, or agent of,
the corporation or of a related corporation and has not been made or
threatened to be made a party to the proceeding in question. The committee,
once established, is not subject to the direction or control of, or termination
by, the board. A vacancy on the committee may be filled by a majority vote
of the remaining members. The good faith determinations of the committee
are binding upon the corporation and its directors, officers, and shareholders.
The committee terminates when it issues a written report of its
determinations to the board.
MINN. STAT. § 302A.243 (1986), repealed by Minn. Laws, ch. 172, § 11 (1989).
30. The principal case criticizing Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979),
was Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). Zapata held that not only
must a corporation prove the independence and good faith of its special litigation
committee, there must also be a “reasonable basis” for the committee’s decision. Id. at
789. Furthermore, even if such a reasonable basis exists, Zapata authorizes a court to
exercise its own judgment regarding whether the suit should proceed. Id. The purpose of
this broad power is “to provide a safeguard against the danger that the difficult-to-detect
influence of fellow-feeling among directors (i.e., so-called ‘structural bias’) does not
cause cessation of meritorious litigation valuable to the company.” Biondi v. Scrushy,
820 A.2d 1148, 1164 n.40 (Del. Ch. 2003).
In Black v. NuAire, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 203 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), the Minnesota
Court of Appeals echoes these very concerns, stating that “the possible risk of hesitancy
on the part of the members of any committee . . . to investigate the activities of fellow
members of the board where personal liability is at stake is an inherent, inescapable,
given aspect of the corporation’s predicament.” Id. at 210-11 (quoting Auerbach, 393
N.E.2d at 1002). But the court failed to address the concerns directly and instead adopted
the Auerbach approach, finding that even if courts could provide a more objective
analysis of disputed corporate decisions than a conflicted special litigation committee,
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impartial committees, noting that it is “unrealistic to assume that
members of [special litigation] committees” are not likely influenced by
31
those who appoint them. Furthermore, the business professionals who
typically serve on such committees may have a “there but for the grace
of God go I” attitude toward derivative claims that prevents them from
making impartial decisions as to whether a suit should proceed against
32
their fellow corporate leaders. For reasons such as these, Delaware and
courts in other states began, in the early 1980s, to allow courts to inquire
into not only the good faith and independence of special litigation
33
committees, but also the substance of their decisions.
It was in this legal landscape that Minnesota Statutes section
34
302A.243 was first applied in Black v. NuAire.
The Black decision
held that the express language of section 302A.243 required the court to
review the decisions of a special litigation committee only to determine
if they were made in good faith, defined as “honesty in fact in the
35
conduct of the act or transaction concerned.” The court in Black also
stated that this standard of review was consistent with the approach
followed by other jurisdictions with similar statutes, and cited the
36
reasoning of those decisions as supporting its decision.
In particular, the court in Black noted two policy rationales
37
discussed in Auerbach v. Bennett that supported its decision. First,
such oversight would “work an ouster of the board’s fundamental responsibility and
authority for corporate management” and must therefore be rejected. Id. For further
discussion of the academic and judicial debate on this subject in the early 1980s, see
generally Cox, supra note 17 (summarizing development of the business judgment rule in
the early 1980s), and Dent, supra note 16, at 105-09 (arguing that the use of special
litigation committees may effectively prevent derivative suits in most cases).
31. Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709, 716 (Iowa
1983).
32. Douglas M. Branson, The Rule that Isn’t a Rule—the Business Judgment Rule,
36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 641-42 (2002) (characterizing “structural bias” as “the
predilection of directors to favor those of the same social or economic class, such as
fellow directors or senior managers” and to sympathize with the directors of a
corporation to such an extent that their neutrality is compromised).
33. See, e.g., Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1981).
34. 426 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). The reason for the absence of
decisions and law on the subject is likely that, as the Minnesota Supreme Court noted,
“shareholder-derivative litigation is not an everyday occurrence in Minnesota’s courts.”
Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 882 (Minn. 2003).
35. Black, 426 N.W.2d at 211 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 302A.011 subd. 13 (1986)).
36. Id. at 210 (citing Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980) (construing Delaware law); Lewis v. Anderson, 615
F.2d 778, 784 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980) (applying California
law); and Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979) (applying New York law)).
37. 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979).
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decisions regarding the interests of a corporation should be delegated to
those best positioned to make them, namely the directors of the
38
corporation. Second, it noted that the business judgment rule promotes
efficiency in the resolution of corporate affairs by “[precluding]
stockholders from disrupting the board’s decision through derivative
actions where the board has determined a particular action is not in the
39
corporation’s best interest.”
Both of these rationales boil down to a
single principle: the decisions of a corporate board are presumed to be
exempt from challenge unless and until it is proven that the board is
40
incapable of acting in the best interests of the corporation. When Black
was decided, this reasoning (known as the “Auerbach approach”) was a
41
subject of vigorous debate.
The Black decision considered, but
declined to adopt, alternatives to the Auerbach approach because of its
“interpretation of section 302A.242 to preclude judicial interference
beyond inquiry into the interest and good faith conduct of an appointed
42
committee.”
43
It
In 1989, Minnesota Statutes section 302A.243 was repealed.
was replaced with Minnesota Statutes section 302A.241 subdivision 1,
which specifically empowered Minnesota business corporations to
appoint “special litigation committees,” but was silent as to the level of
44
deference that must be accorded to such committees. The legislative
record contains some evidence that the repeal of section 302A.243 was
not intended as a comment on the substance of the section or the decision

38. Black, 426 N.W.2d at 211 (citing Auerbach, 393 N.E.2d at 1000).
39. Id.
40. Id. See also Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 882 (“The business judgment rule is a
presumption protecting conduct by directors that can be attributed to any rational
business purpose.”) (citing DENNIS J. BLOCK, ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE:
FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS § 18 (5th ed. 1998)).
41. See supra note 17.
42. Black, 426 N.W.2d at 210 n.3.
43. Minn. Laws, ch. 172, § 11 (1989).
44. In relevant part, Minnesota Statutes section 302A.241 subdivision 1 states:
A resolution approved by the affirmative vote of a majority of the board may
establish committees having the authority of the board in the management of
the business of the corporation only to the extent provided in the resolution.
Committees may include a special litigation committee consisting of one or
more independent directors or other independent persons to consider the
legal rights or remedies of the corporation and whether those rights and
remedies should be pursued. Committees other than special litigation
committees . . . are subject at all times to the direction and control of the
board.
MINN. STAT. § 302A.241 subd. 1 (2001)
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45

in Black, but was instead an attempt to give the courts “flexibility” to
46
“develop” the business judgment rule. These statements at least imply
that the legislature envisioned that Minnesota courts would someday
deviate from the rule in Auerbach. There could be no other logical
reason to offer courts “flexibility” with the intent to “allow the case law
47
to develop,” particularly when the Black court believed its application
48
of the Auerbach approach was mandated by section 302A.243. At the
very least, it appears evident that the legislature intended the courts to
substantively consider alternatives to Auerbach in light of the ongoing
49
scholarly and judicial discussion of special litigation committees.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals, however, interpreted the
50
comments of Senator Luther otherwise.
When the court of appeals
next considered the application of the business judgment rule to special
51
litigation committees in Skoglund v. Brady, it specifically held that the
decision in Black “was not affected by the repeal” of Minnesota Statutes
section 302A.243 and that Black therefore continued to control how the
52
decisions of special litigation committees should be evaluated.
53
Skoglund cited the comments of Senator Luther as if they expressly
54
endorsed the holding of Black. As noted above, this holding is at least
somewhat inconsistent with the express language of the Black decision
55
itself and the comments of the senator.
Skoglund also explained the
45. See Drilling v. Berman, 589 N.W.2d 503, 506 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (citing
Senator Luther’s statement at the hearing before the Senate Commission on the Judiciary
on April 11, 1989). In repealing MINN. STAT. § 302.243, the legislature also stated:
Notwithstanding any contrary provision of Minnesota Statutes, chapter 645,
the repeal of Minnesota Statutes, section 302A.243, does not imply that the
legislature has accepted or rejected the substance of the repealed section but
must be interpreted in the same manner as if section 302A.243 had not be
[sic] enacted.
Minn. Laws, ch. 172, § 12 (1989).
46. See Drilling, 589 N.W.2d at 506 (citing Senator Luther’s statements at the
senate hearings that the repeal of section 302A.243 was intended to give the courts
“flexibility” to allow the case law of the business judgment rule to develop).
47. Id.
48. Black, 426 N.W.2d at 210.
49. See Drilling, 589 N.W.2d at 506.
50. See supra note 45.
51. 541 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
52. Id. at 21.
53. See supra note 45.
54. Skoglund, 541 N.W.2d at 21.
55. Black, 426 N.W.2d at 209-10 (“We interpret section 302A.243 to preclude our
courts from reviewing the merits of a recommendation to dismiss a shareholder’s
derivative action when that recommendation is made by a disinterested committee
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policy arguments made in Black when describing the general function of
the business judgment rule, but failed to evaluate them in light of
56
possible alternatives or state that they were the basis for its decision.
The Minnesota Supreme Court declined to review the Skoglund
57
decision. After Skoglund, Minnesota courts applied the business
judgment rule as a general principle of law outside the context of special
58
litigation committees.
The next case to consider the use of special litigation committees to
59
terminate derivative litigation was Drilling v. Berman. In Drilling, the
60
court considered Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado and similar cases from
North Carolina and Massachusetts that adopted and applied alternatives
61
to the Auerbach approach.
However, Drilling rejected all of these
62
alternatives without any substantive analysis. Instead, the court stated
that the level of deference to be accorded to special litigation committees
63
“is not a question of first impression.”
While technically true, the
reality is that in the decade before Drilling, no Minnesota court had ever
taken up the nearly express direction of the Minnesota legislature to
“develop” the law of special litigation committees. The court in
Skoglund had wrongly claimed, mistakenly or for rhetorical purposes,
64
that it was bound by Black. The Drilling court followed along by
65
holding that Skoglund and Black were controlling precedent.
The inquiry into the “good faith” and “independence” of a special
litigation committee, as authorized by these cases, is a very limited and
deferential process. It can be described by the Drilling court as follows:
[T]he corporation may be expected to show that the areas and
conducting its investigation in good faith.”).
56. See Skoglund, 541 N.W.2d at 20-21.
57. See Skoglund v. Brady, 541 N.W.2d 17, 21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), review
denied (Minn. Feb. 27, 1996).
58. Minnesota also applied the business judgment rule as a general principle of
common law in St. James Capital Corp, v. Pallet Recycling Assoc. of N. Am., Inc., 589
N.W.2d 511, 515 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) and Wigart v. Cervenka, 1999 WL 243231 *3
n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (unpublished). However, neither of these cases involved the
appointment of a special litigation committee.
59. 589 N.W.2d 503 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
60. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
61. Drilling v. Berman, 589 N.W.2d 503, 507 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Zapata
Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1981), Houle v. Low, 556 N.E.2d 51, 59
(Mass. 1990) and Alford v. Shaw, 358 S.E.2d 323, 328 (N.C. 1987)).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Skoglund v. Brady, 541 N.W.2d 17, 20-21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
65. See Drilling, 589 N.W.2d 509.
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subjects to be examined are reasonably complete and that there
has been a good-faith pursuit of inquiry into such areas and
subjects. What has been uncovered and the relative weight
accorded in evaluating and balancing the several factors and
66
considerations are beyond the scope of judicial concern.
Under this deferential review, the only proper inquiry is “[w]hether
67
a committee’s investigative methods demonstrate good faith.”
Furthermore, “[r]ather than focusing on one element of the committee’s
investigation, the proper inquiry is into the adequacy of the committee’s
68
procedures and methodologies as a whole.”
Factors recognized as
relevant to this inquiry include:
(1) the length and scope of the investigation, (2) the
committee’s use of independent counsel or experts, (3) the
corporation’s or the defendants’ involvement, if any, in the
investigation, and (4) the adequacy and reliability of the
69
information supplied to the committee.
Under this approach, even a short report that fails to address pertinent
issues is deserving of judicial deference, provided that it describes a
70
regardless of how
methodology that is “reasonably complete,”
outlandish or seemingly unreasonable the conclusions reached by the
71
committee might be.
III. JANSSEN: FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Facts
In Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, certain members of the Minneapolis
72
Police Relief Association (the “MPRA”), including lead plaintiff
66. Drilling, 589 N.W.2d at 508 (citing Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1003
(N.Y. 1979)) (emphasis in original).
67. Id. at 509 (citing Auerbach, 393 N.E.2d at 1003) (emphasis added).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 509 (citing Lewis v. Boyd, 838 S.W.2d 215, 224 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992)).
70. Drilling, 589 N.W.2d at 507-08 (stating but not agreeing with appellants’
contention that the “brevity of the committee’s report indicates a lack of good faith
because it does not . . . address all of the claims raised in appellants’ complaint”).
71. Id.
72. The MPRA is a Minnesota nonprofit corporation charged with administering a
pension fund maintained for approximately 1000 Minneapolis police officers hired before
June 15, 1980, and their spouses and beneficiaries. MINN. STAT. § 423B.04 (2003). The
MPRA is incorporated and operates under MINN. STAT. 317A, the Minnesota Nonprofit
Corporation Act, and is governed by a nine member Board of Directors, which is elected
by its members. MINN. STAT. § 423B.05 subd. 1 (2003).
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George Janssen, brought a derivative suit on behalf of the MPRA against
two of its partners, Brian Rice and Charles Berquist (collectively “Best”),
73
alleging attorney malpractice.
Plaintiffs alleged that Best had
committed malpractice in its alleged review of certain ill-fated
investments the MPRA made through an investment adviser named
74
David Welliver (“Welliver”).
In 1996 and 1997, the MPRA lost
approximately $15 million in one such investment, a company known as
75
The MPRA Board engaged two separate law firms to
“Technimar.”
conduct investigations into this loss and to prosecute several related
76
lawsuits.
However, the MPRA Board of Directors (the “Board”)
specifically declined to initiate legal action against Best, who remained
77
78
its general counsel. Plaintiffs brought this action and several others
only after failed attempts to assume control of the Board and to convince
the Board to support their claims against Best. Plaintiffs alleged that
Best served as general counsel for the MPRA and failed to conduct a
79
“due diligence” inquiry into the Technimar investment.
The lawsuit
alleged that the Board was biased and could not make an impartial
80
decision as to whether Best should be sued.
In response to the lawsuit, the Board appointed attorney Robert A.
Murnane (“Murnane”) to investigate Plaintiff’s claims and determine
whether it was in the best interests of the MPRA to join in Plaintiff’s
81
claim.
The Board instructed Murnane to conduct an independent
review of this issue but not to “reinvestigate” facts discovered by the two
law firms previously hired by the Board in connection with the Welliver
82
investments.
Murnane, however, was free to deviate from the
83
conclusions of those reports.
After several months of reviewing voluminous documentary
evidence and records from other legal proceedings, Murnane concluded
that pursuing legal action against Best would “not be a prudent use of the
84
85
MPRA funds.” Murnane did not interview Plaintiffs or their counsel.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 879 (Minn. 2003).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Stocke v. Berryman, 632 N.W.2d 242, 246 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 879-80.
Id. at 880.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The Board then moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ derivative suit on the
grounds that the court should defer to the judgment of the MPRA, as
86
exercised by its special litigation committee.
The district court held
that the business judgment rule, as applied through special litigation
87
However,
committees, applies to Minnesota nonprofit corporations.
the court found that Murnane’s first investigation was impermissibly
limited insofar as the Board had instructed him not to reinvestigate facts
88
described by prior investigations.
Additionally, the court could not
determine whether Murnane had offered a business judgment or legal
opinion, and was concerned that Murnane did not interview Plaintiffs
89
and their counsel.
Instead of ruling on the Board’s motion to dismiss, the district court
deferred its decision and gave the Board an opportunity to remedy the
deficiencies in Murnane’s original report by instructing Murnane to
conduct an additional investigation and to submit “adequate evidence of
90
independence and good faith.”
The Board subsequently instructed
Murnane to conduct such additional investigation as he deemed was
appropriate and clearly indicated that Murnane was not limited in any
way with respect to the information he could consider or the
91
investigation he could conduct. Murnane then duly conducted such an
expanded investigation, which included additional review of various
documents as well as interviews with several plaintiffs and their
92
counsel. At the end of the investigation, Murnane again provided the
Board with a report that concluded that pursuing the plaintiffs’ claims
93
against Best was not in the business interests of the MPRA.
Based on Murnane’s second report, the Board renewed its motion to
dismiss, which was converted into a motion for summary judgment by
94
the district court and granted. The district court specifically found that
Murnane’s investigation was conducted independently and in good
95
faith.

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 881 (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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B. Janssen in the Minnesota Court of Appeals
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s
decision, finding that Minnesota nonprofit corporations lack the statutory
96
authority necessary to appoint a special litigation committee.
Specifically, the court held that under the Minnesota Nonprofit
Corporations Act, the Board could only establish committees “subject at
97
all times to the direction and control of the board.”
The Business
Corporation Act, on the other hand, also contains such language but
98
specifically exempts special litigation committees from board control.
The court reasoned that the differences between these two sections
indicated that the legislature did not intend to allow nonprofit
corporations to appoint any independent committees and that the
inability to appoint such an independent committee was an absolute
barrier to the appointment of any special litigation committee by such a
99
corporation.
More importantly, the court of appeals also found that Murnane’s
investigation failed to satisfy the demands of the business judgment
100
rule.
Specifically, the court found that the district court, having ruled
that Murnane’s first investigation was not conducted with independence
and good faith, could not later defer to a decision by that same
101
committee.
C. Janssen in the Minnesota Supreme Court
The Minnesota Supreme Court partially reversed the court of
appeals, holding that the general authority granted by the Minnesota
Nonprofit Corporations Act permits nonprofit corporations to appoint a
special litigation committee whose decisions are entitled to deference
102
Specifically, the court held that the
under the business judgment rule.
modern Nonprofit Act and the Business Act were revised many years
apart and that a review of the pertinent legislative history relating to each
act “produced no discernible indication of why” special litigation

96. Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 645 N.W.2d 495, 498 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002), aff’d,
662 N.W.2d 876, 881 (Minn. 2003).
97. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 317A.241 subd. 1 (2000)).
98. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 302A.241 subd. 1 (2000)).
99. Id. at 498-99.
100. Id. at 499-500.
101. Id. at 500.
102. Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 884-85 (Minn. 2003).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss2/5

14

Moutz: Janssen v. Best & Flanagan: At Long Last, the Beginning of the En
5 MOUTZ - PAGINATED.DOC

2003]

12/8/2003 2:51 PM

BEGINNING OF THE END OF AUERBACH?

503
103

committee language was omitted from the Nonprofit Act.
In the
absence of legislative history, the court considered the consequences of
104
adopting the court of appeals’ interpretation of section 317A.241.
The
two consequences discussed by the court were reminiscent, but
significantly different from, the policy rationales of Auerbach: the ouster
of nonprofit directors from corporate governance and the desirability,
from a corporate board’s point of view, of being able to “weed out
105
The court concluded, after applying these Auerbachnuisance suits.”
like policy rationales, nonprofit and for-profit corporations were
identically positioned and that, accordingly, both should be afforded the
106
ability to appoint special litigation committees.
The Minnesota Supreme Court argued that the court of appeals’
statutory argument was misguided because, while “statutes govern
certain aspects of corporate life . . . corporate litigation has largely been a
creature of common law” that courts can properly address even in the
107
absence of express statutory authority.
Alternatively, the court argued
that the power to appoint a special litigation committee was one aspect of
108
the broad “incidental” powers of a corporation to govern its affairs.
The court concluded that the business judgment rule, as applied through
special litigation committees, applies to Minnesota nonprofit
109
corporations.
However, the court went on to note that it was not
adopting “a particular version of the business judgment rule for use with
110
Minnesota nonprofit organizations.”
After this lengthy analysis, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed
the court of appeals’ decision that the district court could not defer to
Murnane’s second report, holding that whenever a district court
103. Id. at 886.
104. Id. at 886-87.
105. Id. at 887.
106. Id. at 887-88.
107. Id. at 887.
108. Id. (“The old concept of a corporation as a bundle of only a few, specifically
granted powers, has been replaced by the concept of a corporation as an artificial person,
lacking only those powers which the law specifically denies to it.”) (citing HOWARD L.
OLECK, NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND ASSOCIATIONS § 168 (6th ed.
1994).
109. Id. at 888.
110. Id. at 888 n.5 (noting that a more “exacting” level of judicial scrutiny might be
called for in the case of nonprofit corporations because the risk of losses cannot be spread
to other investments and because investments may be less mobile than in the case of a
business corporation). The potential ramifications of these remarks, which arguably draw
an untenable distinction between business and nonprofit corporations, for special
litigation committees in Minnesota are discussed below.
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concludes that a special litigation committee report does not satisfy the
business judgment rule, any pending derivative suit must proceed
111
immediately.
According to the court, a board of directors that is faced
with derivative litigation has “one opportunity to exercise its business
112
The majority
judgment” through a special litigation committee.
argued this absolute rule “strike[s] a balance” between corporate
autonomy and the “nullification” of shareholder rights that would occur
if the courts allow corporate boards to “continually improve” their
113
investigations to meet the demands of the business judgment rule.
Implicit in this argument is the assumption that a more lenient rule would
allow corrupt corporate boards to collude with their special litigation
committees to obtain judicial sanction for their decision to bar a
114
derivative action.
Justice Hanson, joined by Chief Justice Blatz, concurred with the
majority’s decision regarding the application of the business judgment
rule to nonprofit corporations, but dissented as to its holding that
Murnane’s second investigation could not be considered by the district
115
court.
Justice Hanson argued that there was “no authority” supporting
the majority’s “one strike you’re out” rule and that the need for
supplemental court-ordered investigations by a special litigation
committee should simply be viewed as additional facts that may be
116
relevant to evaluating the committee’s good faith and independence.
IV. THE JANSSEN BALANCING ACT AND ONE-STRIKE RULE—
STUMBLING TOWARD A NEW PARADIGM
OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY IN MINNESOTA?
The Minnesota Supreme Court decision in Janssen purports to be
based on an attempt to “balance” allowing corporations to “control their
own destiny” and the desirability of “permitting meritorious suits by
117
shareholders and members” to proceed.
Interpreted broadly, Janssen
points toward an abandonment of the Auerbach approach in Minnesota
and may, in the end, accomplish what the legislature’s repeal of
Minnesota Statutes section 302A.243 did not—give the Minnesota Court
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 888-89.
Id. at 890.
Id.
Id. at 888.
Id. at 890 (Hanson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 890-91 (Hanson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 890.
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of Appeals an opportunity to develop a new paradigm for evaluating the
decisions of special litigation committees.
The Janssen decision cites two principal rationales for allowing
nonprofit corporations to appoint special litigation committees. First, a
“properly functioning board of directors” is better equipped than the
courts to make judgments concerning the “merits of a lawsuit” brought
118
by a shareholder or member.
Second, nonprofit corporations “would
119
These principles
benefit from the ability to weed out nuisance suits.”
are reminiscent of the reasoning articulated in Auerbach, but seem to
place a greater emphasis on the desirability of allowing corporations to
eliminate meritless derivative litigation as opposed to absolute board
120
control over corporate affairs.
Prior to Janssen, Minnesota decisions
expressly regarded the protection of corporate autonomy as a principal
121
For example, the Black court
goal of special litigation committees.
described one of the purposes of the business judgment rule as
“preclud[ing] stockholders from disrupting the board’s decision through
derivative actions where the board has determined a particular action is
122
not in the corporation’s best interests.”
Despite the arguably different
emphasis of the Janssen decision, it is clear that Janssen did not wholly
abandon Auerbach’s autonomy rationale. The Janssen decision opposes
allowing the judiciary to review “the merits of every lawsuit brought by a
member of a nonprofit corporation” on the grounds of limited judicial
123
corporate autonomy, and a lack of judicial expertise in
resources,
124
business affairs.
However, these concerns are tempered by a
substantial criticism of the special litigation committee that is implicit in
the Janssen decision’s bright line rule giving corporate boards “one
125
opportunity” to appoint such a committee.
This aspect of the decision imposes a limit on the otherwise broad
118. Id. at 886 (emphasis added).
119. Id. at 887 (emphasis added).
120. See Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002 (N.Y. 1979).
121. See Skoglund v. Brady, 541 N.W.2d 17, 21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Drilling v.
Berman, 589 N.W.2d 503, 506-07 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
122. Black v. NuAire, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (citing
Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979)); see also Skoglund, 541
N.W.2d at 20 (citing Black, 426 N.W.2d at 209-10).
123. Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 886. It is odd that the Janssen court would cite this
rationale after itself noting that “shareholder-derivative litigation is not an everyday
occurrence in Minnesota’s courts.” Id. at 882. Presumably, any administrative burden
associated with judicial involvement in such suits would be minimal, at least in
Minnesota.
124. Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 882.
125. See id. at 890 (citing Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501, 508 (Del. Ch. 1984)).
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126

power of trial courts to manage litigation.
Specifically, it prevents a
trial court that has found a lack of independence from permitting a
127
corporate board to cure this deficiency through a second investigation.
This bright-line rule is inconsistent with the purposes of the business
judgment rule as it has been traditionally articulated by both the Eighth
Circuit and Minnesota state courts, and is not directly supported by any
128
decisions in other jurisdictions.
Until Janssen, Minnesota courts
viewed board autonomy as an essential aspect of corporate existence that
must be protected against shareholder or member interference except
where the members of a board or their appointees are afflicted by
129
Carrying this reasoning through to its logical
partiality or self-interest.
conclusion supports the argument that courts should have the discretion
to permit additional investigations by a special litigation committee for
purposes of curing errors in its original mandate provided that the
130
committee proceeded independently and in good faith.
The majority rejected this approach, because “[i]f the courts allow
corporate boards to continually improve their investigation to bolster
126. For example, a trial court is normally permitted to accept a renewed motion for
summary judgment at any time. See id. at 891 (Hanson, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
127. Id. The court did suggest that a district court could defer its decision to dismiss
a derivative claim pending the submission of additional evidence concerning a
committee’s methodology. Id. at 889 n.6.
128. The majority does cite several cases in support of this proposition. Id. at 88990. However, all of these cases stand only for the proposition that a derivative suit
should proceed when summary judgment has been denied and do not reach the issue
decided by the majority in Janssen—that a trial court lacks the discretionary authority to
allow a board to order its special litigation committee to supplement a deficient report.
See, e.g., Hasan v. CleveTrust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 372, 380 (6th Cir. 1984);
Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1003 (N.Y. 1979); Houle v. Low, 556 N.E.2d 51,
53 (Mass. 1990); Will v. Engebretson & Co., Inc., 261 Cal. Rptr. 868, 873-74 (Ct. App.
1989); Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 972 (Del. Ch. 1985); Davidowitz v. Edelman, 153
Misc.2d 853, 858 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
129. See Black v. NuAire, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 203, 210-11 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
130. Such a process would not be appropriate in every case and could even raise
additional questions about the integrity of the committee. As Justice Hanson stated:
There may be situations where an initial investigation by a special litigation
committee is so tainted that an expanded investigation, at least by the same
committee, could not cure the deficiencies in the required independence and
good faith. For example, if there was evidence that [a special litigation
committee] had developed some bias or was committed to reach the same
recommendation no matter what facts or arguments were brought to [its]
attention, the [revised] second report would stand no better than the first.
Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 891 (Hanson, J., dissenting).
These concerns, however, could appropriately be addressed by the district court
in the course of evaluating the good faith and independence of the committee.
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their business decision, the rights of shareholders and members will be
131
While this argument is susceptible to several
effectively nullified.”
interpretations, the most reasonable are: (1) any additional investigations
ordered by a district court will be guided by the will of the board toward
132
the inevitable conclusion that proposed litigation should be denied,
and (2) a board that has once failed to appoint a special litigation
committee to act independently and in good faith should not be trusted to
133
utilize the special litigation committee mechanism.
However, in either
event, the Janssen decision expresses a fundamental distrust of the
special litigation committee mechanism and assumes that courts are
incapable of exercising their discretion to prevent manipulation of that
134
system.
In a final attack on the Auerbach approach, the Janssen decision
specifically noted in dicta that concerns particular to nonprofit
corporations may justify application of “a more exacting standard of
judicial review” to nonprofit corporations than is applied to business

131. Id. at 890.
132. This remark is reminiscent of a broader criticism of the special litigation
committee mechanism: that such committees are appointed only because the directors
know they will provide a desirable decision. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 888 (2d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, Baldwin v. Joy, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983) (“If . . . the directors expected
any result other than a recommendation of termination . . . they would probably never
establish the committee.”)
133. This interpretation, if correct, does not account for the categorical prohibition
on supplemental investigations, which the Janssen decision adopted. It is entirely
possible that a board may be mistaken as to the scope of the investigation that should be
conducted or otherwise make some entirely innocent mistake that, under Janssen, would
doom their corporation to derivative litigation. Presumably, a “continually improving”
series of investigations implicitly or expressly guided by the courts would better serve the
legitimate interests of shareholders or members than a derivative suit that is permitted to
proceed only because of a technical error by the corporation’s board. It is more likely,
therefore, that the Janssen decision was concerned about a structural problem in the way
special litigation committees operate rather than the effect of a failure to correctly appoint
a special litigation committee.
134. The mere expression of these concerns may not determine what approach the
Minnesota Supreme Court adopts. Nearly all courts have recognized that the decisions of
special litigation committees may be infected by structural bias but many have
nevertheless found that “independent directors are capable of rendering an unbiased
opinion despite being appointed by directors and sharing a common experience with the
defendants.” Strougo v. Bassini, 112 F.Supp.2d 355, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing Peller
v. The Southern Co., 707 F.Supp. 525, 527 (N.D.Ga. 1988), aff’d, 911 F.2d 1532 (11th
Cir. 1990)). However, at the same time, these are the same kind of criticisms that have
led other courts to abandon the Auerbach approach. See, e.g., Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1981); Houle v. Low, 556 N.E.2d 51, 56 (Mass.
1990); and Alford v. Shaw, 358 S.E.2d 323, 328 (N.C. 1987).
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135

corporations.
Courts that have applied the business judgment rule to
136
nonprofit corporations have not entertained such an approach, though
137
some commentators have endorsed it.
More importantly, the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s concern for shareholders who cannot freely
move their money out of a nonprofit corporation might equally well be
applied to many business corporations, potentially including in some
138
cases closely held corporations or even publicly traded corporations
with alienation restrictions on employee-owned stock.
These
135. Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 888 (Minn. 2003). This
statement is arguably at odds with Janssen’s earlier discussion of the business judgment
rule and its application to nonprofit corporations. Id. at 883 (concluding that the same
needs which drive application of the business judgment rule to business corporations
including corporate autonomy, limits on judicial ability to review business decisions, and
the need to discourage overly risky adverse behavior apply in the case of nonprofit
corporations as well and concluding “that the boards of nonprofit corporations may
receive the protection of the business judgment rule”). Id.
136. See Finley v. Super. Ct., 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 128, 132 (Cal. Ct. App. 4 Dist. 2000)
(applying business judgment rule to decision of special committee appointed by
homeowners association); Miller v. Bargaheiser, 591 N.E.2d 1339, 1343 (Ohio 1990)
(applying business judgment rule to decision of special committee appointed by hospital);
see also Fairhope Single Tax Assoc. v. Rezner, 527 So. 2d 1232, 1235-36 (Fla. 1987)
(equating members in a nonprofit association with stockholders in a corporation, the
court applied the business judgment rule to the nonprofit organization and declined to
substantively review the decisions of its governing body); Tiffany Plaza Condo. Assoc.
Inc., v. Spencer, 416 So. 2d 823, 826-27 (Fla. Ct. App. 1982) (while not specifically
mentioning the business judgment rule, the court effectively applied it by deferring to the
judgment of the corporation in determining whether a particular real estate improvement
was necessary or beneficial to the association); Chun v. Bd. of Trs. of the Employees’
Ret. Sys., 952 P.2d 1215 (Haw. 1998) (applying business judgment rule in context of
public pension plan); Papalexiou v. Tower West Condo., 401 A.2d 280, 286 (N.J. Sup.
Ct. 1979) (applying the business judgment rule to preclude legal action on the merits of a
decision made by the board of directors of a nonprofit corporation); Dockside Ass’n, Inc.,
v. Detyens, 352 S.E.2d 714, 716 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987) (noting that the business judgment
rule applies especially well to nonprofit corporations); Burke v. The Tennessee Walking
Horse Breeders & Exhibitors Assoc., 1997 WL 277999, *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (court
applied the business judgment rule in deferring to the decisions of the board of a
nonprofit corporation).
137. See Mary Francis Budig et al., Pledges to Nonprofit Organizations: Are They
Enforceable and Must They Be Enforced? 27 U.S.F. L. REV. 47, 100 (1992) (arguing that
nonprofit corporations are exempt from many market and internal forces that promote
responsibility to shareholders); see also Denise Ping Lee, Note, The Business Judgment
Rule: Should It Protect Nonprofit Directors? 103 COLUM. L. REV. 925, 956 (2003)
(arguing that the threat of litigation is essential to ensure nonprofit directors since other
methods of controlling directors are not available in the nonprofit context and endorsing
an ordinary negligence standard of conduct for nonprofit directors).
138. A similar argument was made and rejected in Black v. NuAire, Inc., 426 N.W.2d
203 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), based upon the express language of former MINN. STAT. §
302A.243. Id. at 211.
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possibilities are all the more real given the absence of viable precedent
on this point and Janssen’s silence on the issue of what standard of
review should be applied to those special litigation committees appointed
139
by business corporations.
While Janssen may represent a realization that special litigation
committees are a potentially flawed mechanism, the court’s reaction to
this epiphany leaves much to be desired. The Janssen “one strike” rule
inflexibly gives plaintiffs’ attorneys an opportunity to benefit from goodfaith mistakes by a board while failing to prevent directors from
appointing committees that formally follow an appropriate methodology
140
but whose conclusions are nevertheless substantively biased.
In other
words, this rule combines the worst elements of the Auerbach approach
with an increased probability that meritless derivative suits will be
permitted to proceed against corporations. However, Janssen is not
entirely without merit. The one-strike rule may allow courts to catch an
unethical board in the act of controlling its special litigation committee
or encourage boards to exercise greater caution to ensure that special
litigation committees are independent and act in good faith.
It would have been more consistent with the concerns expressed by
the court, as well as with the policy rationales of Auerbach, to adopt a
more flexible approach to special litigation committees—such as giving
corporate boards accused of partiality the option of appealing to the trial
courts to select, appoint, and monitor a special litigation committee for
141
them.
In order to defer any burden this approach might have on the
139. The Janssen decision specifically refrained from addressing these issues in the
context of either nonprofit or corporate in general. See Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 888 n.5
(“We do not adopt a particular version of the business judgment rule for use with
Minnesota nonprofit corporations today.”); see also id. at 886-88 (discussing numerous
“principles” that guide the decision but refraining from any explicit endorsement of a
particular approach to special litigation committees). Furthermore, as argued supra Part
II, controlling precedent on this point (Skoglund, Drilling, and Black) is arguably no
longer relevant (in the case of Black) or is based on a misinterpretation of precedent and
legislative history (Skoglund and Drilling). In short, the way is open for the Minnesota
courts to adopt a less-deferential version of the business judgment rule.
140. See discussion of the deferential approach Minnesota courts have taken when
reviewing the decisions of special litigation committees, supra Part II. Since courts have
limited their analysis to whether a committee’s methodology was proper, a committee
could shelter improper motives and substantively biased conclusions through a formally
neutral and complete methodology.
141. Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709, 709 (Iowa 1983)
(holding that directors charged with misconduct may not participate in the selection of
special litigation committee members and that, where the majority of a board is accused
of bias, the corporation may apply to the court for judicial appointment of a special
litigation committee).
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judicial system, corporations could be required to pay a modest
administrative fee for this service. This solution would have the
advantage of reducing the numerous problems occasioned by allowing
directors accused of misconduct to select those who will determine their
fate and could, if the courts exercise good judgment, also reduce the
impact of the structural bias that concerned Zapata and its progeny.
Another difficulty with Janssen is that the decision fails to fully
address the concerns the Minnesota Supreme Court has expressed about
the potential for abuse of the special litigation committee. Janssen’s
decreased emphasis on corporate autonomy and concern that special
litigation committees may become vehicles to prohibit legitimate
shareholder claims suggest that the Minnesota Supreme Court has
implicitly endorsed a more substantive paradigm for evaluating the
142
decisions of such committees.
This “balancing” of the need to permit
legitimate shareholder suits while respecting corporate autonomy is more
reminiscent of Zapata than Auerbach.
The essence of Zapata is a two-step standard of review requiring
courts to first consider the independence and good faith of a
143
committee,
and second to “determine, applying its own business
144
The
judgment” whether the derivative suit should be dismissed.
145
second step does not necessarily involve a detailed factual inquiry.
Furthermore, the second step is discretionary and is employed only
where a court senses that the procedural requirements of the business
judgment rule have concealed substantive bias or that the shareholder’s
action is deserving of further review prior to termination in order to
146
This review has
ensure that the corporation’s interests are protected.
been compared to an “imprecise smell test allowing the court to search
between the lines of the SLC’s report of [sic] the scent of a meritorious
claim enclosed within a record that has not been opened by truly
147
adversarial proceedings.”
142. See Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 890 (expressing the concern that shareholder’s
rights would be nullified if a corporate board is allowed to use investigation to bolster
their business decision).
143. See Strougo v. Bassini, 112 F.Supp.2d 355, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (summarizing
Zapata approach).
144. Id.
145. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788-89 (Del. 1981) (stating that
the court’s review requires only a “balancing of probabilities as to the likely future
benefit” of the suit to the corporation, not a detailed analysis of the proposed suit’s
merits).
146. Id. at 789.
147. Strougo, 112 F.Supp.2d at 368 (quoting Johnson v. Hui, 811 F.Supp. 479, 490
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In some sense, Janssen has implicitly endorsed a limited and
inflexible version of this approach by finding that the failure to appoint
an independent committee is suspicious enough to taint all further efforts
by a board to redeploy the committee, even if subsequent investigations
are procedurally flawless. The Janssen court appears to have “looked
between the lines” and found that such a situation likely indicates
misconduct. It would be wholly consistent with Janssen for a court to
apply this same methodology and “balancing test” in other circumstances
where the facts suggest a meritorious suit is being suppressed.
There are several good reasons for the Minnesota courts to do so.
First, as discussed in this article, Skoglund, Drilling, and Black are not
based on firm authority, and the reasoning of Janssen seems to authorize
a rejection of the Auerbach approach. Furthermore, a majority of
jurisdictions have recognized the fundamental problems inherent in the
special litigation committee system, as explained above, and found that
148
these problems necessitate substantive judicial intervention.
Adopting
the approach of one of these jurisdictions, such as the Zapata approach,
would give the Minnesota courts an extensive amount of experience and
precedent to draw upon. Janssen has opened the door for the Minnesota
courts to take up the task given to it by the legislature when Minnesota
Statutes section 302A.243 was repealed. All that remains is for an
enterprising trial court or appellate court to walk through it.
V. CONCLUSION
Until Janssen, the Minnesota Court of Appeals had mistakenly held
that it was bound to follow the Auerbach approach for over a decade.
Janssen did not directly address the propriety of these decisions, but it
did present a framework that, if followed in subsequent decisions, would
seem to suggest that a less-deferential approach to special litigation
committee decisions is now the law of Minnesota. The precise contours
of this new approach have yet to be defined by the courts, but the
fundamental logic of Janssen and strong public policy concerns suggest
that a version of the Zapata or Miller approaches may be appropriate.

(N.D. Cal. 1991)).
148. See id. at 362 (stating “[s]tructural bias in special litigation committees has been
widely discussed and analyzed” and noting that the standards of review developed by
courts are “designed to overcome the effects, if any, of structural bias”) (citing Weiland
v. Illinois Power Co., 1990 WL 267364, at *15 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 1990)).
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